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Abstract 
The present paper discusses the views of Noble Laureate 
Amartya Sen with reference to his book Resources, Values 
and Development and in relation to his existential emphasis 
on moral foundation of policy-making. Sen deviates from 
traditional welfare economics. He feels that utilitarianism 
is sensitive to total benefit of different persons; while 
maximin or leximin principle cares for the worst-off. Sen, 
however, posits weighing and balancing of conflicting 
consequences within an outcome morality rather than a 
hierarchy of priorities and constraints, with the general 
existential approach that existence is a series of 
appearances without anything hidden behind it. Sen 
wishes his theory of economics to be based on doing, on 
capability, without the least appropriative component in 
it. It should be as pure an activity as Sartrean play 
possible, since it alone ensures freedom from regional and 
national boundaries in order to build a world-order 
wherein rights, whatever their claims, are not inviolable.  
   
Economics, and for that matter, all disciplines, worth the name, 
explicitly or not so explicitly, raise questions of morals, particularly 
in regard to giving up the psychology of interest. Amartya Sen, 
though not a philosopher, none the less, underlines in his theory of 
economics the necessity of abandoning the psychology of interest 
in general, along with any utilitarian interpretations of human 
                                                          
* Associate Professor, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra. 
email:anamika.kuk@gmail.com 
ISSN 0975-332X│https://doi.org/ 10.12726/tjp.9.2
Anamika Girdhar                                                                        ISSN 0975-332X 
38 
 
conduct by revealing to us the ideal meaning of economic attitudes. 
These meanings are beyond egoism and altruism, beyond also any 
economic behaviour which is called disinterested behaviour. 
In his essays compiled in his Resources, Values and Development, 20 
in numbers, nine of them in the latter part of the book make Part- 
IV and Part-V. These two parts are devoted to morals and mores, 
beginning with Essay 12. He himself specifies in the Preface that 
these essays are mainly concerned with development economics, as 
it is normally understood, and that many of them deal with various 
aspects of resource allocation in that context, and in particular with 
the role of motives and values in resource use and its assessment. 
Even in Part I, II and III of the book, the dominant concern, as is 
evident from the above statement, remains moral, though it 
amounts to a major departure from the traditional welfare 
economic approach, because  Sen makes some reassessment of, as 
he says, “the moral foundation of policy making and resource 
allocation” in Essays 12 and 13 (vii). 
While tracing the moral foundation of economics, in his Essay 12 
entitled “Ethical Issues in Income Distribution: National and 
International”, Sen takes issue with utilitarianism. It is because “the 
dominant approach in economics has undoubtedly been the 
utilitarian one and that tradition still exercises a good deal of 
influence on the way normative problems are posed and dealt 
within economics” (Sen 25). 
Sen then contrasts utilitarianism with other approaches, including 
their bearings on judgements of income distribution and some 
controversies on international inequalities and their policy 
implications. Utilitarianism, according to him, provides a 
convenient point of departure in examining moral issues (Sen 277). 
For instance, utilitarianism when studied in its three dimensions, 
namely consequentialism, welfarism and sum-ranking, controverts 
itself in the three rival theories of morality, all of which argue for 
replacement of one or more of their features. One of the rival 
theories, „maximin‟ identified with Rawls‟ „difference principle‟ 
argues that the goodness of any set of individual utilities must be 
judged entirely by the value of its least member, i.e. the worst-off 
individual. This clashes with the theory of sum-ranking i.e. the 
happiness of all. 
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Utilitarianism is, as Sen avers, sensitive to total benefits of different 
persons; while „maximin‟ or „leximin‟ principle cares for the worst-
off.  The latter is sensitive to interpersonal utility distribution, which 
utilitarianism ignores. But Rawls‟ own version, says Sen, of the 
„difference principle‟ runs into difficulties, as for example, a man 
with expensive taste may require more benefit than the utilitarian 
allows. Thus, Sen employs comparisons between result anticipated 
and the result obtained in order to point out that negation is simply 
a quality of judgement and the expectations of the questioner. Sen 
does not accept economic propositions at their face value, taking 
them as if they were essences – complete and full, beyond question 
and judgment. While utilitarianism involves consequentialism, 
welfarism and sum-ranking, „leximin‟ or „maximin‟ relaxes sum-
ranking but sticks to welfarism and is consistent with 
consequentialism. Similarly, Rawls‟ „difference principle‟ based on 
primary goods, and equity principles based on primary powers, 
drops welfarism also, but remains consistent with 
consequentialism. 
In themselves, both utilitarianism and its contrasting values of 
Rawls‟ „difference principle‟, for example, seem not to contain any 
negation. A negative judgment, on the other hand, by virtue of 
being a subjective act, as per Sen‟s questioning, is strictly identified 
with the affirmative judgement. These two movements are born 
simultaneously. The opposition in them is part of the system. In 
this sense, no economic position, as Sen shows, is fool-proof. Under 
the consequentialist approach, actions, obligations and rights must 
be judged ultimately in terms of the outcome morality, i.e. morality 
involved in judging states of affairs ideally when these rights have 
intrinsic moral acceptability, irrespective of consequences of the 
exercise of these rights. On the other hand, economists, like Nozick, 
have argued for non-consequentialist route to these morals. But 
alternative of leaving consideration of liberty and rights completely 
out of the outcome morality and using non-consequentialist 
framework, according to Sen, has its own problems, for instance, 
when the aggregate utility gain of the gang exceeds the utility loss 
of the solitary victim. 
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Sen, therefore, posits weighing and balancing of conflicting 
consequences within an outcome morality, rather than a hierarchy 
of priorities and constraints, with the general existential approach 
that existence is a series of appearances, without anything hidden 
behind it. Hence, none of the consequences – be it utilitarianism or 
its opposite – is privileged. No one alone is sufficient to reveal 
reality in whatever field, in totality. It indicates itself and the total 
series by showing forth a hole in its heart. Reality, as Jean-Paul 
Sartre would say, is transphenomenal. It follows then that there is 
no hidden reality. All are appearances and all of them are in their 
isolation insufficient, requiring interpretations. Sen finds that the 
labour theory of value can be interpreted in many different ways, 
for example, “descriptive, productive or evaluative” (284), and 
while the descriptive interpretation can be thought to be the 
primary one, the evaluative interpretation has been important in 
social criticism using such Marxian concepts as „exploitation‟.  But 
it can be faulted because in this approach welfarism is rejected, and 
the entitlements are related not to utilities but to labour 
distributions, such as equal pay for equal work. 
Thus, in these theories of value, Marxian theory is only one of the 
series; hence transphenomenal. Those who take the Marxian 
approach seriously are highly mistaken. It, for one, rejects the view 
of property rights. But for all its wide appeal that there should be 
no property rights, mankind still feel tempted to own a house, a 
piece of land, and so on. Sen feels that property rights have also 
had much support for nearly three hundred years (284). Recently 
Robert Nozick has provided an elegantly worked out entitlement 
theory, covering property rights. He defines principles of justice in 
acquisition and transfer; a person acquiring holdings in accordance 
with these principles are entitled to them, and no one is entitled to 
holding except by repeated applications of these two principles. 
The principles are so constructed that a person is not only entitled 
to what he himself produces with his own labour, but also to what 
is produced by resources owned by him and what he can acquire 
by free exchange of what he legitimately holds ( Sen 284-85). 
  
Sen points out that most of these theories of entitlement – whether 
of labour entitlement (and exploitation) or of property rights (and 
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of Nozick‟s structure) – have emphasized the arbitrariness of 
chosen principles (285). What Sen means to say is that these 
principles on which entitlement theories are sought to be based are 
not objective, by questioning whether they capture moral intuitions 
deeply enough, or whether they build on immediate prejudices, as 
each one of them in relation to a subject is constantly changing. 
Although a value may disclose itself, such as in Marx‟s non-
property right or in Nozick‟s property rights, it does so only 
through a single theory. This replaces reality with phenomenon. 
This arbitrariness of chosen principles shows itself in Marx who so 
assiduously built a proven case for equal pay for equal labour. Sen 
observes: 
It is perhaps worth remarking that while Marx made 
considerable use of exploitation and undoubtedly gave it 
evaluative relevance, he also expressed skepticism about the 
moral depth of labour entitlement. Giving ultimate priority 
to distribution „according to needs‟, he describes claims 
arising from labour as residing within „the narrow horizon 
of bourgeois rights,‟ viewing persons only as „workers and 
nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored 
(285). 
Sen resolves this impasse of arbitrary principles sought to be thought as 
absolutes by appealing to the existential subjective approach, in section 1.7 
of Essay 12, with the sub-heading „Agent-relative action moralities‟. 
According to him, the special sense of responsibility that a person feels for 
his or her family or friends may influence his moral judgements (Sen 285). 
If that influence affects his judgements of goodness of outcomes, it may be 
argued that this partiality is a violation of the requirement of 
„universalizability‟ which has characterized much of ethical theory, at 
least since Kant. While such subjectivism which Sen calls partiality in 
judging states of affairs may be thought to be a moral weakness, the case, 
he feels, is somewhat less clear when it comes to judging actions, since 
actions are agent-specific in a manner that states of affairs are not. A man 
may like to give a toy to his own child as part of his special duty. If this 
line is taken, then the morality in the question has to be non-
consequentialist, since agent-relativity would have to be introduced in 
evaluating action but not its outcome. 
Nevertheless, agent-relativity is one of the most complex issues in 
ethics. Agent-relativity is one aspect of the moral issue. The choice 
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has to be made by the agent. This gives the agent his humanness. 
He is really a man, because he is responsible for what he does. 
What he/she does has value because he or she has chosen to do it. 
There are no values given a priori. But the other side of it is, lest the 
agent should become „instrumental‟ in his subjective choice – not 
responding, as Sen says, “to demands of love and affection, except 
instrumentally [. . . [.” (286). This sounds depressing to Sen, and 
indeed it is, for “Agent-relative duties can also be based on ties 
other than those of kinship and affection, and can even reflect 
economic relations, for example, what one citizen owes to another” 
(286). 
Sen calls this general class of agent-relative obligations as 
„relational obligations‟. Put in existential terms, Sartrean in 
particular (Sartre in his Existentialism and Humanism) as also in 
terms of George Eliot's novel The Mill on the Floss to which Sartre 
refers, its heroine Maggie though believing her passion for Stephen 
as having real value, requiring sacrifice, is poised between the 
claims of two moralities. But "heedlessly seeking her own 
happiness chooses in the name of human solidarity to sacrifice her 
interest and gives up the man she loves" (Sartre, Existentialism and 
Humanism 63-64). 
Sen is also able to reconcile the rival claims of two moralities: what 
you choose for yourself, you must also choose for others. He 
equates humanism with existentialism, not the humanism which 
takes man as an end, but one who legislates himself, not turning 
back upon himself, but always seeking beyond himself, an aim, 
says Sartre, which is one of liberation or of some particular 
realization, that man can realize himself as truly human 
(Existentialism and Humanism 67). 
In this spirit of value judgement, there is nothing contradictory 
whether one chooses high marginal utility of personal income 
under utilitarianism or low total personal utility under „leximin‟ or 
„maximin‟ or low personal availability of primary goals under 
Rawls‟ „difference principle‟ or low primary power of person under 
need-based equity axioms or violation of personal liberty 
consequent on denial of income of the person or high labour 
contribution under labour entitlement theories or entitlement 
under principles of justice in acquisition or transfer or high rational 
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obligation under agent-relation action moralities. As Sen says, 
value of judgements in this area typically tends to be 'non-
compulsive' precisely because they are all series of economic 
phenomena, without there being any compulsion, or as he says, 
"even though the purist systems like utilitarianism or entitlement 
theories demand unqualified adherence” (288). Sen further 
observes: "When more than one claim is accepted and there are 
several non-compulsive principles competing for attention, we 
have a complex moral structure. Since moral complexity, in this 
sense, is a commonly observed phenomenon, it is necessary to 
discuss how such complexes may be resolved (288). 
Faced with conflicts among different criteria, Sen uses the well 
worn method of a common approach, i.e. to go by dominance, 
whereby to make only those judgments that satisfy all criteria. But 
the fault-line in this view is that it is arbitrary, depending on the 
presence of some information and absence of others” (291). In 
existential terms, especially Sartrean, there is no passing beyond 
the concrete phenomenon towards its essence. It simply is. It does 
not hide itself. It is impossible, for example, "to define being as 
presence since absence too discloses being since not to be there”, 
adds Sartre, “means still to be” (Being and Nothingness, 8). It all 
depends upon what information we have of the object. 
With the utilitarian outcome morality, the consequences that have 
to be pursued are gains and losses. In contrast, the „leximin‟ will 
lead to strategic focus on utility levels as such, i.e. not on whether 
there is a great deal of gain but that the gain goes to the people who 
are relatively worse-off in utility terms. On the other hand, 
Rawlsian version of „difference principle‟ will concentrate on the 
availability of primary powers. Similarly, equity principles based 
on primary powers will have a non-utility focus. Through these 
contrasting issues of morality, Sen underlines that consciousness 
should ideally be, not the consciousness of full presence; one can be 
conscious of absence. This consciousness of an absence appears 
necessarily as a pre-condition of presence. 
Nevertheless, most countries pursue the interests of their own 
people only. But existentially what they think for their own people, 
they must also think for the people of other countries. This is 
existential humanist approach, i.e. to think beyond oneself. It is not 
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in turning back upon himself with such aphorisms 'charity begins 
at home' that one is moral, but by seeking beyond himself, as 
noticed earlier in Sartre, an aim which is one of liberation or of 
some particular realization, that man can realize himself as truly 
human. 
 Sen is also of the view that in "a universalized consequentialist 
moral structure, the population of the world has to be viewed 
together, and the outcome morality chosen has, in principle, to be 
applied to the world population as a whole" (295). But this is not a 
piety that  Sen asks for. In Essay 13: titled "Rights and Capabilities", 
he carries over his discussion from Essay 12, wherein he points out 
how utilitarianism overlooks certain information in order to justify 
itself. It is shown in Essay 12 how the case for a specific moral 
approach may rest on the dual characteristic of the presence of 
some information and the absence of others. 
In Essay 13, Sen begins his discussion by pointing out the irony of 
the excluded information by referring to William James remark in 
his Principles of Psychology, “The art of being wise is the art of 
knowing what to overlook” (307). This is what utilitarianism and 
for that matter, all theories do. The limitation of utilitarianism 
arising from overlooking everything other than total utility has 
been much discussed.  Sen attempts to discuss that limitation of 
utilitarianism which is not only much less discussed, but it is also 
the most blatant form of inequalities and exploitation by saying 
that the deprived and the exploited bear their burden well (309). 
However, the main discussion in Essay 13 focuses itself and rightly 
so, on the question of rights and capabilities. The right-based moral 
approach has an obvious advantage, meets as it does, the question 
of deprivation. Nevertheless, this approach begs the question: why 
do people have rights? Indeed, do they have moral rights?  Sen 
raises this question not because he intends to discuss it, but because 
he intends not to discuss it; indeed it is a very difficult question, as 
rights can take many different forms, such as right to health, 
employment, education, etc.  Sen is of the view that these rights do 
not specify directly what a person may or may not have. Rights as 
such are detrimental to human happiness. Sen's own study of many 
large famines in the recent past, in which millions of people died, 
revealed that there was no over-all decline in food availability in all 
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and yet the famines occurred, as he says, precisely because of shifts 
in entitlement resulting from exercise of rights that are perfectly 
legitimate, legally rather than good, morally speaking. But there are 
economists like Nozick who consider the moral system of 
ownership quite close to the legal system of property rights and 
market exchange. 
Sen evidently does not deny legal rights, but his concern is that the moral 
rights should not be overlooked. His obvious concern is not with rights, 
but with capabilities. It is in this respect that his economics differs. He 
uses existential psychoanalysis to say that to do is not necessarily to have 
or to possess, and that doing has to be gratuitous, done without any 
reason to possess – „a play‟, which Sen terms as 'capability'. As Sartre asks: 
"Can we discover an appropriative derive in sport?" (Being and 
Nothingness 742) Rights, according to Sen, should also be taken not 
seriously, but sportively. Not that thing done sportively, as if it were a 
play, is completely without any degree of possessiveness, say the desire to 
win, but a victory in a game is least possessive, unless it is solely played 
for medals or money. 
It would be purely abstract to define ownership by the right to 
destroy, for example, and furthermore in a society with a 'planned 
economy' an owner can possess his factory without having the 
right to close it; in Imperial Rome, the master possessed his servant 
without the right to put him to death. Besides what is meant here 
by the right to destroy, the right to use? (Sartre, Being and 
Nothingness 748) In the third part of Essay 13, Sen considers a good 
for example, like rice, to illustrate that the utilitarian will be 
concerned with the fact, “the good in question creates utility 
through consumption" (315).  But it is not the only thing it does; he 
also takes into account its nutritious value: owning some rice gives 
the person the capability of meeting some of his or her nutritional 
requirements (Sen 315). 
Rice has other characteristics as well, e.g. satisfying hunger, 
providing stimulation, adds Sen. However, Sen is not concerned in 
this Essay with these characteristics; he wishes to go beyond, to 
capabilities. He distinguishes these characteristics from capabilities. 
While the former is a feature of a good, the latter is a feature of a 
person in relation to it. Having some rice gives one the capability of 
functioning in a particular way, e.g. without nutritional deficiencies 
of particular types. The capability to function, accordingly, "is the 
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thing that comes closest to the notion of positive freedom, and if 
freedom is valued then capability itself can serve as an object of 
value and moral importance" (Sen 316). 
Rendered in existential psychological terms, capability comes to 
mean that one is capable of functioning in freedom by living on the 
diet of rice alone. This function is independent of the nutritional 
value of a good (rice) as also a characteristic of a good (nutrition and 
calories). The third distinction is that of functioning of a person (in 
this case, living without calorie deficiency. The forth distinction, of 
course, is that of utility (pleasure or desire-fulfilment). Focusing on 
the third, i.e. functioning of a person without calorie deficiency, e.g. 
the person can compensate calorie deficiency, if rice is either not 
available or is replaced by another food. The point Sen makes is 
that the capability to function means what a person in this way can 
do or cannot do, or can be or cannot be: 
These freedoms are not primarily concerned with what 
goods or income resources people have. Nor with precisely 
how much pleasure or desire-fulfilment people get out of 
these activities (or from the ability to do these activities). 
The category of capabilities is the natural candidate for 
reflecting on the idea of freedom to do (316). 
As is clear, Sen relates capabilities with freedom. If one says that 
rice is desirable because it is necessary to live, he seems to say that 
this value is transcendently given. Sen feels that this attitude is the 
outcome of taking everything material so necessary that we feel 
that without it we cannot live. And this attitude is very common. It, 
indeed, rules the world. Sen repudiates this spirit of seriousness, as 
Sartre also does, by saying that "The seriousness of the problem of 
survival and nutrition should not turn us all into Physiocrats" (525). 
Things do not have values in themselves; they are given by human 
subjectivity. That is why Sen says, "If we value capabilities, then 
that is what we do value, and the possession of goods with the 
corresponding characteristics is instrumentally and contingently 
valued only to the extent it helps in the achievement of the thing 
that we do value, viz. capabilities (317). 
Thus, Sen favours the possession of capabilities over and above 
primary goods, since they existentially have some more human 
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ends. In arriving at these moral ends by not pursuing blindly goods 
which are nothing but "mute demands" as Sartre puts it (Being and 
Nothingness 796). Sen also had to steer clear his passage through 
certain positions, e.g. utilitarianism, the Nozickian entitlement 
theory, the Rawlsian focus on primary goods, the Dworkin's 
approach of equality of resources. The point he finally arrives at is 
that rights are not sacrosanct, for all that we appropriate we 
possess symbolically, which death always renders it unachieved, to 
borrow Sartrean view of appropriation. Thus, doing is reduced 
fruitlessly to having. Sen wishes his theory of economics to be 
based on doing, on capability, without the least appropriative 
component in it. It should be as pure an activity as possible, since it 
alone ensures freedom from regional and national boundaries in 
order to build a world-order wherein rights, whatever their claims, 
are not inviolable.  
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